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THE THREE-LEGGED PIG:
RISK REDISTRIBUTION AND ANTINOMIANISM IN AMERICAN
LEGAL CULTURE*
Marc Galanter**
A. The Jaundiced View of Civil Justice
Law may be viewed as a device for redistributing risk. The civil justice system
attempts to reduce certain risks, like the risk of not getting paid, or indirectly, the
risk of injury from another's intentional or negligent action. In doing so, it
increases the probability of other events that some actors consider a risk-for
example, the risk of being sued or inspected or forced to hire lawyers. So the
legal system redistributes risks, reducing some and enlarging others. Actors mod-
ify their expectations and their actions in the light of their estimation of these
new conditions.
These estimations and revised expectations are formed not directly by what
happens in the legal system, but by what people think happens there-that is, by
people's perceptions of what happens as framed by their judgments about what
normally and typically happens there. I shall present evidence that in the
American case, the gap between perceptions and reality is more than a matter of
random error or frictional distortion, but is substantial and systematic. Further,
the resulting screen of misperception is itself a significant influence on the uses
and workings of civil justice.
I focus particularly on one component of this screen: the vast and persistent
overestimation by influential segments of American society of the degree to
which accountability is imposed and enforced by the legal system. A wide stream
of disillusionment with the civil justice system emerged in the 1970s.1 Since it
does not really have a name, let me supply one. I call it the "jaundiced view."
By this I refer to a set of beliefs and perceptions about the legal system summed
up in the observation that the United States is suffering a horrendous "litigation
explosion" in which people are suing each other indiscriminately about the most
frivolous matters, and juries capriciously award immense sums. The "jaundiced
view" displaced an earlier indictment of the legal system for failure to supply
justice to all. In the course of a decade the prevailing critique of legal institutions
shifted from "not enough justice" to "too much law."2
* Prepared for delivery at Symposium on Tort Reform at the Mississippi College School of Law, Nov.
15, 2002. An earlier version was presented at the Conference on "Court Reform and Economic Growth,"
Madrid, Oct. 18-20, 2000. Copyright M. Galanter, 2002.
** John and Rylla Bosshard Professor of Law and South Asian Studies, University of Wisconsin--
Madison and Centennial Professor, Department of Law, London School of Economics. Email:
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1. Perhaps the earliest major marker of this "turning away from law" was the 1976 "National
Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice" (known as the "Pound
Conference") organized by Chief Justice Warren Burger. The proceedings of the Conference are published at 70
ER.D. 79 (1976). See Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know
(and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. Ruv. 4 (1983) (not-
ing the emergence and rise of this stream of criticism).
2. Marc Galanter, Predators and Parasites: Lawyer-Bashing and Civil Justice, 28 GA. L. RE. 633
(1994), and Marc Galanter, The Turn Against Law: The Recoil Against Expanding Accountability, 81 TEX. L.
Rsv. 285, 288-89 (2002).
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This "jaundiced view" is particularly prevalent among business, media and
political elites. Corporate spokesmen and their political allies mournfully recite
the woes of a legal system in which Americans, egged on by avaricious lawyers,
sue too readily, and irresponsible juries and activist judges waylay blameless
businesses at enormous cost to social and economic well-being. The legal sys-
tem, we are told, is arbitrary, berserk, crazy and demented. It has "spun out of
control." The resulting "litigation explosion" is unraveling the social fabric and
undermining the economy.
These assessments are grounded in a pervasive folklore of horror stories and
anecdotal evidence. Everyone is familiar with-and almost as many believe-a long
series of legends about the American legal system: the old lady who obtained
millions of dollars from McDonald's after she spilled hot coffee on herself;3 the
United States being home to seventy percent of the world's lawyers;4 excessive
litigation and parasitic lawyers undermining the American economy. The last was
especially popular a decade ago, when critics of the American civil justice sys-
tem noted that "number one" Japan had few lawyers and little litigation.
Although the Japan item has lost its appeal, the general point of law and lawyers
as a drag on the economy still enjoys popularity.
5
Of course, there are grains of truth in the jaundiced view. The expectations of
protection and remedy that people bring to law are higher and these have elicited
some responsiveness from the legal system, curtailing somewhat the leeways and
immunities of society's managers and authorities. But overall, there has been no
diminution in the position of the dominant economic actors in American society.
A summary measure is provided by looking at the cost of liability to corporate
actors. An insurance industry survey annually computes the total cost of liability
(insurance costs plus retained losses) for a large number of companies of all
sizes throughout the United States. Fluctuation from year to year reflects both
changing cost levels and changes in the identity of the companies that participate
in the survey. But it is clear that there is no upward trend line. If we take the lat-
est available data on the cost of liability and compare it with earlier years at five-
year intervals, we see that cost in 1998 is the lowest in the series.
3. See Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends About the Civil Justice System, 40
ARiz. L. REV. 717, 731-33 (1998) (discussing the McDonald's case and other horror stories).
4. See Marc Galanter, News from Nowhere: the Debased Debate on Civil Justice, 71 DENY. U. L. REV.
77, 77-83 (1993) (reporting on the curious history of the seventy-percent legend).
5. Robert E. Litan, The Liability Explosion and American Trade Performance: Myths and Realities, in
TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: COMPETITION, INNOVATION AND CONSUMER WELFARE, 127 (Peter H.
Schuck, ed., 1991); W, Kip Viscusi and Michael J. Moore, Rationalizing the Relationship between Product
Liability and Innovation, id. at 103. On the persistent belief in, and absence of evidence for, the drag on the
economy story, see Galanter, supra note 4; Galanter, supra note 3.
[VOL. 22:47
2002] THE THREE-LEGGED PIG: RISK REDISTRIBUTIONAND ANTINOMIANISM IN 49
AMERICAN LEGAL CULTURE
Year Average liability cost per $100 of revenues
1978 33 cents
1983 29 cents
1988 No data collected
1993 32.9 cents
1998 24.3 cents
Source: Cost of Risk Survey 1995: 47; RIMS Benchmark Survey 1999: 171.
There is fluctuation from year to year, so any single year may not be a reliable
indicator. But if we take periods of five years, we find that the overall cost of lia-
bility to U.S. companies was lower for the most recent five-year period than for
any five-year period since collection of this data commenced in 1977.
Nor, in spite of the pronouncements of some eminent economists, is there any
evidence that American civil justice has had deleterious effects on the economy.
Indeed the best evidence suggests that comparative economic growth is not ham-
pered by high populations of lawyers or by tort litigation.'
B. Explaining the Perceptual Screen
What produces and sustains the glaring contrast between the actual and imag-
ined contours of the civil justice system? Some of the sources of this gap are
endemic to social life. The literature of cognitive psychology catalogs a number
of factors that lead to biased inferences and judgments about uncertain events 7
For example, decision makers often ignore relevant information about baseline
frequencies, misattributing representative characteristics to data. The frequency
of easily remembered events is exaggerated, leading to overestimation of risk
from publicized hazards relative to less visible ones.8 "Vivid information, that is,
concrete, sensory and personally relevant information, may have disproportion-
ate impact on beliefs and inferences."9 Furthermore, biased receptiveness to con-
firming evidence makes people excessively confident in the accuracy of their
knowledge." In other words, the way our minds are built inclines us to think we
know more than we do.
And in this case, we don't know very much. The scope for cognitive distortion
is enlarged by the derelict state of the knowledge base about civil justice. Even
though we have accumulated a great deal of data and insight during the past
6. Frank B. Cross, Lawyers, The Economy, and Society, 35 AM. Bus. L. J. 477 (1998).
7. ROBERT E. NISBET AND LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL
JUDGMENT (1980); Kahneman and Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction, 80 PSYCHOL. REv. 237 (1973);
Kahneman and Tversky, Subjective Probability: A Judgment of Representativeness, 3 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 430
(1972). Much of this literature is usefully assessed in Elizabeth F Loftus and Lee Roy Beach, Human Inference
and Judgment: Is the Glass Half Empty or Half Full?, 34 STAN. L. REV. 939 (1982); Amos Tversky and Daniel
Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207
(1973); Tversky and Kahneman, Belief in the Law of Small Numbers, 76 PSYCHOL. BULL. 105 (1971).
8. Loftus and Beach, supra note 7, at 944-45.
9. Nisbett and Ross, supra note 7, at 190.
10. Loftus and Beach, supra note 7, at 946.
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twenty years, we simply don't have a fund of systematic social knowledge about
the working of the civil justice system.11 Court statistics are rudimentary: for
example, they do not record the detailed subject matter of cases, the characteris-
tics of the parties, or the events in the case; information about settlements is not
officially collected and is often shrouded in secrecy, with the support of courts.
Even actors who are repeatedly involved in litigation may not be in a position to
give an analytic account of their experience.12 No one has seen fit to invest in the
continuous collection of the basic information. Lawyers, typically uninterested in
aggregates and empirical verification,"4 have tolerated a situation in which anec-
dotes and surmises have filled the void of genuine inquiry. 4
These create opportunities for professional aggrandizement and careerism.
Business people concerned about liability are surrounded by retainers and entre-
preneurs with strong incentives to intensify that concern. For example, Edelman,
Abraham and Erlanger found that "personnel professionals and practicing
lawyers have a shared interest in constructing the threat of wrongful discharge in
such a way that employers perceive the law as a threat and rely upon those pro-
fessions to curb the threat."1" A host of professionals, consultants, and publicists
thrive by magnifying the sense of crisis and touting their ability to exorcize the
menace of enhanced liability. These messages are amplified by a small industry
of corporately-supported think tanks, lobbyists, consultants and "grass roots"
groups that attempt to generate political support for "reforms" of the civil justice
system." Politicians and organizational entrepreneurs, in turn, echo the jaun-
diced view in order to cultivate financial support and garner votes.
11. Galanter, supra note 4, at 99-103; Marc Galanter, Bryant Garth, Deborah Hensler, and Frances Kahn
Zemans, How to Improve Civil Justice Policy, 77 JUDICATURE 185 (1994).
12. See Steven Garber, Product Liability, Punitive Damages, Business Decisions and Economic
Outcomes, 1998 Wis. L. REV. 237 (1998) (for a heightened suspicion that the "in the dark" hypothesis cannot
be dismissed); Herbert M. Kritzer and Frances Kahn Zemans, The Shadow of Punitives: An Unsuccessful Effort
to Bring It into View, 1998 Wis. L. REv. 157 (1998) (discussing their aborted attempt to survey corporations on
their punitive damages experience suggests either that they are unwilling to share such information or that they
are simply in the dark themselves).
13. The same indifference to verified factual patterns pervades legal scholarship. As Philip Shuchman
observed twenty years ago "a persuasively stated argument by a well-known law teacher published in a presti-
gious law journal, though it be based largely on anecdote, will be uncritically accepted as though it contained
true statements about the effects of the legal system on society and business firms." P SIucHNAN, PROBLEMS OF
KNOWLEDGE IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP A- 12 (1979).
14. If fables about law circulate so readily among lawyers and legal academics it is not surprising that
even normally scrupulous sources can stumble when it comes to assessing information about law. Perhaps the
high water mark of scientific respectability attained by jaundiced view folklore was the appearance in SCIENCE
in late 1989 of a standard recitation of punitive damages lore. R. Mahoney and S. Littlejohn, Innovation on
Trial: Punitive Damages versus New Products, 246 SCIENCE 1395 (1989); see STEPHEN DANIELS AND JOANNE
MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICS OF REFORM 206-210 (1995) (for an extended analysis of the rhetoric of
the preceding article).
15. Lauren B. Edelman, Steven E. Abraham, and Howard S. Erlanger, Professional Construction of Law:
The Inflated Threat of Wrongful Discharge, 26 L. & Soc'Y REv. 47, 77 (1992).
16. See DANIELS and MARTIN, supra note 14, at chs. 1,2,7; Stephen Daniels and Joanne Martin, Punitive
Damages, Change, and the Politics of Ideas: Defining Public Policy Problems, 1998 WIs. L. REv. 71(1998);
Kenneth J. Chesebro, Galileo s Retort: Peter Huber's Junk Scholarship, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1637 (1993). Cf
(discussing the account of Neal Cohen of Apco Associates, a specialist in creating spurious "grassroots" tort
reform organizations, who gained notoriety when it was disclosed that he exhorted fellow lobbyists about "the
importance of keeping the public in the dark about who the clients really are" Stephen Daniels, The Question of
Jury Competence and the Politics of Civil Justice Reform: Symbols, Rhetoric and Agenda Building, 52 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 269 (1989); Jane Fritsch, Sometimes, Lobbyists Strive to Keep Public in the Dark, NEW YORK
TIMES, Mar. 19, 1996, at Al; "Grassroots & weeds need to be clipped, say angry activists," O'Dwyer's PR
Services Report (June 1996) at 1.
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Such self-promotion is reflected and fed by a persistent media bias that fea-
tures "David beats Goliath" communiqu6s and filters out the "haves come out
ahead" story. Steven Garber reported the results of a study of newspaper cover-
age of verdicts in 351 product liability cases against automobile manufacturers,
decided from 1985 to 1996.17 Two hundred fifty-nine (73.8%) of these verdicts
were in favor of the defendant; only 92 (26.2%) were in favor of the plaintiff."
Newspapers reported nine (3.5%) of the defense verdicts and 38 (41.3%) of the
plaintiff's verdicts.19 In other words, a verdict for the plaintiff is twelve times
more likely to be reported than is a defense verdict. Consequently, a conscien-
tious and omnivorous newspaper-reader would have been exposed to 47 reports,
of which some 80.9% were verdicts in favor of the plaintiff over three times as
great as the actual percentage. Other studies confirm the disproportionate report-
ing of plaintiff victories" and high awards.21 Skewed media coverage reflects
and feeds widespread overestimation of the amount of litigation, the frequency of
jury trials, the portion of plaintiff victories, and the size of jury verdicts. Such
overestimation is not confined to the unsophisticated, but is, if anything, more
pervasive among elites, including lawyers. Generally, lawyers' aggregate percep-
tions about litigation and liability are wide of the mark.22 In a study comparing
South Carolina lawyers', doctors', and legislators' assessments of tort litigation
patterns, lawyers overestimated the portion of awards for plaintiffs and the size
of awards and were only marginally more accurate than other elite respondents.23
17. Steven Garber, Product Liability, Punitive Damages, Business Decisions and Economic Outcomes,
1998 Wis. L. REV. 237, 275.
18. Id. at 275-76.
19. Id. at 277.
20. Daniel Bailis and Rob MacCoun conducted a study of coverage of tort issues in five national maga-
zines from 1980 to 1990. During that period, product liability and medical malpractice cases, taken together,
were some 11% of tort filings and led to 13% of tort trials, but they were 74% of the suits reported on in the
five magazines. A series of earlier studies showed the rate of verdicts in favor of the plaintiff is about 50% for
all torts and somewhat less for medical and product liability cases; reports in the five national magazines por-
trayed 85% plaintiff victories. Donald S. Bailis and Robert J. MacCoun, Estimating Liability Risks with the
Media as Your Guide: A Content Analysis of Media Coverage of Tort Litigation, 20 L. & HuM. BEHAv. 419, 436
(1996). The five magazines were Time, Newsweek, Fortune, Forbes, and Business Week.
21. See id. at 426 (reporting that their "media sample includes 43 distinct reports of specific jury awards,
with a mean of $5,861,097 and a median of $1,750,000, about four and five times the size of the largest mean
and median [actual] court estimates, respectively, and 14 and 34 times the size of the smallest estimates");
Oscar G. Chase, Helping Jurors Determine Pain and Suffering Awards, 23 HOFsTaA L. REV. 763, 771-74 (1995)
(comparing newspaper coverage of personal injury awards in New York with actual awards, discovered even
larger discrepancies). Stories of jury awards to winning personal injury plaintiffs in two metropolitan dailies
(the New York Times and New York Newsday) from 1986 to 1992 were compared with awards to plaintiffs
recorded in the New York Jury Verdict Reporter. In the not unrepresentative year 1992, the average jury award
reported in the New York Times was some 16.5 times as large as the average award recorded in the New York
Jury Verdict Reports for all of New York State and 15.4 times as large as awards recorded in the New York met-
ropolitan area. The disparity in median verdicts was slightly greater. In Newsday's reports, the average award
reported was about 6 times as high as those throughout the state, and the median award reported was about 9
times as high. Id. at 771-73. This bias is not confined to newspapers. Deborah Jones Merritt and Kathryn Barry,
studying tort awards in Franklin County, Ohio, found that "commercial [jury reporting] services appeared more
likely to report verdicts that favored plaintiffs and, among successful plaintiffs, to include higher recoveries."
Deborah Jones Merritt and Kathryn Ann Barry, Is the Tort System in Crisis? New Empirical Evidence, 60 OHIo
ST. L.J. 315, 326 (1999).
22. On the deficiencies of lawyer knowledge about jury awards, see Marc Galanter, The Regulatory
Function of the Civil Jury, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM, 80-86 (Robert E. Litan, ed., 1993);
Donald R. Songer, Tort Reform in South Carolina: The Effect of Empirical Research on Elite Perceptions
Concerning Jury Verdicts, 39 S.C L. REv. 585 (1988). Cf Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: the Promise
and Performance ofNegotiatedRulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255 (1997).
23. Songer, supra note 22, at 597.
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After exposure to accurate information about the level of litigation and size of
awards, lawyers' responses (along with those of doctors and legislators) did not
become appreciably more accurate.24 In a study of litigation against governmen-
tal units in various cities in Kansas, Missouri, and Nebraska, Charles Epp found
"little significant increases and, in some jurisdictions, actual decreases in expen-
ditures on legal services .. .[but that] administrators believe their governments
to be the subject of much litigation that imposes heavy costs."2
Corporate actors are not just the passive recipients of biased information, but
major disseminators of it. Corporate investment in projecting an image of unre-
strained litigiousness and rampant overclaiming may have the paradoxical effect
of increasing the level of claiming. Researchers studying contingency fee law
practice found that:
One of the impacts of the now twenty-year campaign of corporate
America and the insurance industry to convince the American populace
that we are in the midst of a litigation explosion is to increase the calls
that lawyers receive. This is probably most evident in the medical mal-
practice area .... The effect of this rhetoric is to make people think that
if anything goes wrong they can get significant compensation. The result
is that lawyers spend many hours explaining to potential clients that this
is simply not true .... 11
Furthermore, the incessant projection of these images of runaway litigation
may induce corporate functionaries to overestimate the threat and to make settle-
ment and business decisions that cannot be accounted for in terms of prediction
of the propensities of juries and judges. As in the case of chemical weapons, it is
hard for those who launch media distortions to keep them away from their own
troops.
American legal culture carries multiple and inconsistent messages. There is
broad popular awareness that the legal process reflects differences in wealth and
power and individuals do not fare well in comparison with organizational actors
in the legal arena. But, people (including sophisticated academics) are eager to
be reassured that the system is responsive to the little guy, which resonates with
the repeated "David beats Goliath" stories in the press, movies, television, etc.
To these, the jaundiced view has added a third theme: that the legal system is
being abused and exploited by outsiders and opportunists, most frequently to vic-
timize corporations or establishment institutions.
One component of the indictment of the civil justice system is its complicity
with, and encouragement of, claims of victimization. A minor literature laments
24. Songer, supra note 22, at 600.
25. Charles R. Epp, Litigation Stories: Official Perceptions of Lawsuits Against Local Governments 1
(unpublished paper presented at the 1998 Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association, Aspen CO, June 4-
7, 1998) (on file with the author) (emphasis in original).
27. Herbert M. Kritzer, Contingent Fee Lawyers as Gatekeepers in the American Civil Justice System, 81
JUDICATURE 22 (1997).
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the multiplication of victim claims-at least those by individuals claiming they are
victimized by abuse on grounds of race, sex, disability, and so forth.28 But, the
corporate actors against whom many of these claims are brought are themselves
deeply implicated in the victim game,2' envisioning themselves as unjustified
victims of "lawsuit abuse" by opportunistic claimants or overzealous regulators.
Thus, an insurance company advertisement describes product liability law as follows:
an undisguised wolf who has entered corporate headquarters every-
where.... The American public seems intent on going to court. "Sue the
bastards" used to be a joke. Now it's a battle cry. With the help of eager
attorneys, plaintiffs are not only quick to demand justice, but "extra" jus-
tice because their chances of success are great.3 0
Similarly, the head of the National Association of Manufacturers warned his flock:
Like a plague of locusts, U.S. lawyers with their clients have
descended upon America and are suing the country out of business.
Literally. The number of product liability suits and the size of jury
awards are soaring ....
Product liability suits have brought a blood bath for U.S. businesses
and are distorting our traditional values. We're now the most litigious
country on earth one of every fifteen Americans filed a private civil
suit last year. The judicial system is so clogged with cases, delays, con-
tinuances, appeals and legal shenanigans that it's slugging its way
through a perpetual traffic jam. 1
The general counsel of Motorola agreed:
America is awash with lawyers who make mischief .... They are forced
to innovate, to develop new legal products so they can usefully fill their
time, that usually means thinking of ways to separate American corpora-
tions from their money.... The drain on corporate assets and energy is
tremendous. . . . While cases are being litigated, corporate America
often can't do anything innovative because executives are too absorbed in
and exhausted by the legal process. 2
This sense of corporate victimization is the backwash of the rising level of
expectations in society. As the risks of everyday life have declined dramatically
for most people, there is a widespread sense that science and technology can pro-
duce solutions for at least many of the remaining problems.3 (Of course, this is
28. See, e.g., CHARLES J. SYKES, A NATION OF VICTIMS: THE DECAY OF THE AMERICAN CHARACTER
(1992); John Taylor, Don't Blame Me: the New Culture of Victimization, [S.F CHRON.] The World, Aug. 18,
1991, at 7-10.
29. Sally Power, They Did It!, BUSINESS ETHICS (Sep.-Oct. 1993) at 22-27.
30. The Product Liability Menace, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 1976.
31. Robert E Dee, BloodBath, ENTERPRISE 10:3 (1986).
32. Ronald E. Yates, Lawyers Not Exempt from Quality Crusade, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 1, 1991 (Business) 1.
33. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, TOTAL JUSTICE (1985).
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illusory inasmuch as people are capable of identifying or inventing problems as
quickly as they are solved.) But as more things are capable of being done by
human institutions, the line between unavoidable misfortune and imposed injus-
tice shifts. The realm of injustice is enlarged. Once, having an incurable disease
was an inalterable misfortune; now a perception of insufficient vigor in pursuing
a cure can give rise to a claim of injustice. As the scope of possible interventions
broadens, more and more terrible things become defined by the incidence of that
intervention. Thus famine or social subordination or a flawed appearance is not
inalterable fate, but a matter of appropriate interventions. What was seen as fate
may be seen as inappropriate policy.' Advances in human capability and rising
expectations result in a moving frontier of injustice. Like medicine, law and poli-
cy enlarge both the supply of answers and the supply of unanswered questions.
For the most part the advances in human capability and control that drive the jus-
tice frontier are located in or managed by corporate or governmental actors. They
produce new claims of injustice not because they are bad guys, but because they
are good guys doing their thing. Claimants use the civil justice system to stake
claims for increased protection and remedy as entitlements; increased risk (or
even old levels of risk that are now avoidable) is seen as an injustice. To corpo-
rate actors and authorities, these higher expectations seem to impose a new
accountability that intrudes on the privileges and immunities to which their sta-
tion and/or accomplishments and contributions entitle them. To the extent that
legal institutions are seen as the incubator and sponsor of this onerous new
accountability, they are suspect to the very establishment groups that are their
greatest beneficiaries.
C. Visible Costs and Invisible Benefits
To these elite groups the costs and discomforts of law are increasingly palpa-
ble. And frequently, critics who attempt to estimate these costs exaggerate them
by confounding transfers with costs to society. That is, the assets transferred by
the legal system as damage awards may represent costs to losing parties, but they
are not a cost to the society. The same assets still exist, but are now in different
hands-in hands with a greater entitlement under the going rules. There may be
objections to those rules and concern about the transaction costs of effectuating
those transfers. But those are distinct problems. Nor should social expenditures
on law be identified as deadweight losses, for the legal system that consumes
them generates social benefits.
These benefits are frequently underestimated or overlooked entirely. In con-
trast to costs, the benefits conferred by the legal system-the routine performance
of obligations, the safer products and practices, the proliferation of transactional
templates, the reduction in transaction costs-are so common and expected that
they attract no notice. Of course, the legal system cannot be credited with the full
benefit of each of these good things, but it makes significant contributions by
reinforcing and stiffening other controls and occasionally serving as the primary
34. JuDiTH SHKLAR, THE FACES OF INJUSTICE (1990) (discussing the great famine).
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control. Occasionally legal control is visible, but in many instances when law
works most effectively, it disappears from view.
Several studies suggest that a flourishing legal system, amply staffed by
lawyers,3" is associated not only with promotion of significant non-market bene-
fits such as civil liberties and political democracy, but also promotes efficient
allocation by helping to internalize externalities and by facilitating transactions
among dispersed, interdependent, productive units." In such a setting, Ron
Gilson argues, business lawyers create value by acting as "transaction cost engi-
neer[s]."'37 In a pioneering field study of business lawyering, Mark Suchman and
Mia Cahill found that:
Silicon Valley lawyers both absorb uncertainty and increase the efficien-
cy of venture capital financing by promoting the elaboration of commu-
nity norms. Through their distinctive inter-organizational position,
lawyers help to create, transmit, sustain and enforce the social structure
of the Silicon Valley venture capital market."
The social usefulness of law is more starkly evident, if even harder to mea-
sure, in settings where infirm legal systems make us aware of the absence of
such legal infra-structure 9
So American elites' appreciation of the dynamic and adaptive legal system
within which they function reminds me of the farmer who took a visiting digni-
tary to see his prize pig, housed in a special pen in a gleaming new barn. The vis-
itor noticed that the massive, well-groomed pig had a wooden leg. Before he
could ask about it, the farmer was in the middle of recounting the pig's exploits.
"If it weren't for this pig," he told his visitor, "I wouldn't be here today. A year
ago my tractor tipped over and I was pinned under it. Somehow the pig heard me
yelling, figured out a way to get out of his pen and unlock the barn door, came
into the field and pushed that tractor right off me. Not only that, six months ago
that pig saved the whole family. We had a fire in the house when we were all
asleep and somehow the pig got out of the barn and into the house, pulled the
children outside one at a time, woke me up and even dragged out the computer
with all my records. We'd be wiped out if it wasn't for that pig." "Amazing," said
the visitor, "but tell me, how come the pig has a wooden leg?" "Ohhh," said the
farmer, "a pig like that you don't eat all at once."
35. Mark C. Suchman and Mia L. Cahill, The Hired Gun as Facilitator: Lawyers and the Suppression of
Business Disputes in Silicon Valley, 21 LAW & SOc'Y INQUIRY 679 (1996).
36. Cross, supra note 6.
37. Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills andAsset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239
(1984). Cf Robert C. Clark, Why So Many Lawyers? Are They Good or Bad?, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 275 (1992).
38. Suchnan and Cahill, supra note 35.
39. E.g., Kathryn Hendley, Law and Development in Russia: A Misguided Enterprise, American Society of
International Law, Proceedings of the 90th Annual Meeting, Washington, D.C., March 20-27, 1996.; Kathryn
Hendley, et al., Observations on the Use of Law by Russian Enterprises, 13 POST-SOvIET AFFAIRS 19 (1997); JOHN
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